Amaliya Makhatova | 24.09.2026
The Economic Cost of Collectivization: Kazakhstan’s 1930s Famine
The lives of at least 1.5 million people, 1.3 million of whom were ethnically Kazakh, were lost during the 1930-1933 famine in Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic (‘Collectivization in Kazakhstan’, n.d.). During
this time, Kazakhstan was one of the 14 republics of the USSR. Under that Union, freedom of religion was not permitted, differences between people and nationalities were suppressed, and people were forced to hide their culture, traditions, and language (Thomas, 2005). In 1927, Soviet government decided to implement a new policy of collectivization, which was meant to ‘modernize agriculture’ (‘Collectivization’, n.d.), as the economic strength of Russia was mostly based on it (Melnyczuk Morgan, 2010). As the same source states, Stalin believed that after the revolution in February 1917, the Soviet Union was left with a insufficient amount of grain, a major commodity. The main part of it, as Melnyczuk Morgan assumes, was owned by peasants, and was predominantly distributed among them. Thus, in order to retrieve the domination over the production of grain, Moscow violently enforced harsh confiscation of it from peasants (Melnyczuk Morgan, 2010). But in the case of the Kazakh famine, it was used as a method targeting nomads, a lifestyle that the Kazakhs were accustomed to. Through the implementation of collectivization, Stalin aimed to eliminate the nomadism of Kazakhs and radically transform their lifestyle with a complete disregard to the traditions and cultural
background, organization of life which had prevailed in the region for centuries, and potential consequences; it was an intended genocide of Kazakh nation.
As a part of collectivization, Goloshchekin (a Russian politician who was employed by Stalin to work with Kazakh government) with the absolute support of Stalin enabled a plan called “small October” which focused on forcing Kazakh people into becoming more dependent on Russia through eliminating their national language and culture, and demolishing their traditional way of life through a new political institutional structure based on the exploitation of resources and the people of Kazakhstan (Olliver, 2015). As the same source states, he believed that the nomadic culture of the Kazakhs was against his ideals of socialism, as he was convinced that in order to implement this policy successfully, the national differences between people should be eliminated. However, he failed to realize that nomadic lifestyle was actually a part of Kazakh’s culture as ‘more than three-quarters of Kazakhs led a nomadic lifestyle and depended solely on their livestock’ (Magauin, 2008). Left without cattle, Kazakhs had no means to survive (Magauin, 2008). Moreover, through the implementation of ‘small October’, Goloshchekin decided to change the Kazakh alphabet so that Kazakhs could not study their history and to make their language sound more ‘Russian’ (Cameron, 2018).
The consequences of collectivization for the Kazakh nation were fatal. The famine was its main outcome. The mass starvation in Kazakhstan was not the result of bad weather conditions, as Moscow stated, but a sad result of the Soviet Union’s tyrannical campaign of collectivization, the brutal altercation of the Kazakh lifestyle, and the systematic requisitions of grain and livestock (Melnyczuk Morgan, 2010). It is estimated that more than 1.5 million people died during the famine (some sources even report more than 2 million), 1.3 million of whom were ethnically Kazakh. More than 60% of the entire Kazakh population was lost during collectivization, causing it to be the most severe of all regions affected by the famine and the most systematic ethnic massacre of the Soviet famines in the early 1930s (Goble, 2016). Prior to the famine, approximately sixty percent of the country’s population was Kazakh, but drastically decreased to twenty-eight (Magauin, 2008). Moreover, ‘experiences of terror, mass executions, deportations and forced collectivization preceded the famine’ (MelnyczukMorgan, 2010). ‘Thousands of Kazakhs fled to China, but fewer than one-fourth survived the journey; about 300,000 fled to Uzbekistan and 44,000 to Turkmenistan’ (‘Kazakhstan’, n.d.) The famine made the Kazakhs a minority within their own country (Hays, 2008). It was only after 1991, when the republic gained its own independence, and the Kazakh people recover a slim demographic majority within their own country (Hays, 2008).
I discussed these events with my relatives, whose forefathers faced and experienced such discrimination. My aunt replied, “My mother’s four brothers and three sisters died during the famine. My grandfather, who literally saw his children dying because of the famine, once found a cow on the steppes and he brought it home to cook for his children. One Russian woman saw it and complained to the police. My grandfather was arrested and shot for eating, and his whole family was left alone. My grandmother was disabled and she could not work, so almost all of my mother’s sisters and brothers died during this time. My mother and her elder sister were able to escape to Iran”. According to my uncle: “My grandfather told me that his whole family died because of the famine. He said that once food was brought to the village. Everyone was told to line up and wait for their turn. The man who distributed the food said that the Russians were the first to receive food”.
Some people, who defend Stalin and believe that collectivization did not have genocidal nature, argue that the government did not expect Kazakh famine to happen at all. However, Andrea Graziosi, a historian of the Soviet era, proves (1996) the government was aware of the possibility of mass catastrophe, and Stalin himself at the Communist Party Congress in 1925 had stated the high chance of it. Moreover, the secret correspondence between Stalin and Goloshchekin after the collapse of the Soviet Union was finally brought to light; it is clearly demonstrated by letters that they both decided to pretend that ‘there are no needs to consider social and economic features of the republic as it is already "resemble in every detail the central regions of the country"’ (‘The consequences of collectivization’, n.d.). Moreover, a lot of well-known Kazakh historians, such as famous Alikhan Bokeikhanov, wrote numerous letters to government with the warnings that it would take about two-hundred years to reverse Kazakhs nomadism and to peacefully settle in one place; Goloshchekin asserted that he could force them to do it in two-three years (Kindler, 2009). Thus, it could be reasonably inferred that the Soviet government was fully conscious of its actions, and absolutely aware of the possibility of mass catastrophe.
Some Russian historians claim that the famine and grain requisition was conducted everywhere across the Soviet Union, so there is no reason to imply that Stalin targeted Kazakhs. However, although the fact that other regions were starving is undeniable, the fact that approximately ninety-five percent of the livestock and grain cultivated by Kazakhs were taken by the Soviet Union to assist other starving regions (‘The consequences of collectivization, n.d.), despite that the Kazakhs starving the most, implies that Moscow undertook one of the most inhumane sacrifices for the sake of other regions. Сonducted under the aegis of equality, Kazakhs were lured into the dispossession of their cattle and was exploited by Russian forces after the economic crash following the World War. Moreover ‘Kazakhs suffered proportionally much larger losses than other ethnic groups in Kazakhstan and that neighbouring Central Asian republics suffered no such devastating famines’ (Magauin, 2008). Taking all these factors into account, ‘the failures of the Soviet policy of collectivization doesn't seem a sufficient explanation for the famine’ (Magauin, 2008), as there is clearly a tendency of targeting a particular ethnic group, namely Kazakhs.
Even though the Kazakh famine is one of the most severe (by the death toll) genocides in the world, just after the Holocaust and Holodomor, the Kazakh government does not admit the genocidal nature of famine. The Kazakh genocide is one of the most underrepresented genocides in the world. Because of the close relationship with Russia, the famine is not included in the school curriculum, nor are there any days to commemorate the victims of it.
Nowadays, Kazakh people still experience discrimination. Even now Kazakhs tend to hide their culture, traditions and history because they are still afraid. The thing that can be done to improve the situation is in the hands of the government. They have to respect our past and our shared history, in order for future generations not to forget it. I am inclined to believe that government has to spread the information about genocide through the youth, include it in school curriculum and construct some of the memorials to the victims of the famine. Moreover, we, the youth, have to treat our history with respect and appreciation. We, the new generation, raised in a new independence, should be proud to be Kazakhs, proud to speak in Kazakh language, and proud of our history.
Sources:
https://blogs.loc.gov/kluge/2016/08/the-kazakh-famine-of-the-1930s/
https://e-history.kz/en/contents/view/294
https://www.britannica.com/place/Kazakhstan/Cultural-life
https://www.eurasiareview.com/01062016-another-soviet-genocide-kazakhstan-1932-1933-coming-back-to-haunt-moscow-oped/
http://factsanddetails.com/central-asia/Kazakhstan/sub8_4b/entry-4642.html
http://muse.jhu.edu/article/181904
https://www.britannica.com/topic/collectivization
https://e-history.kz/en/expert/view/91
http://euromaidanpress.com/2015/02/02/stalins-holodomor-in kazakhstan-or-a-very-brief-guide-to-the-goloshchekin-genocide/
https://www.sciencespo.fr/mass-violence-war-massacre-resistance/fr/node/3200
this time, Kazakhstan was one of the 14 republics of the USSR. Under that Union, freedom of religion was not permitted, differences between people and nationalities were suppressed, and people were forced to hide their culture, traditions, and language (Thomas, 2005). In 1927, Soviet government decided to implement a new policy of collectivization, which was meant to ‘modernize agriculture’ (‘Collectivization’, n.d.), as the economic strength of Russia was mostly based on it (Melnyczuk Morgan, 2010). As the same source states, Stalin believed that after the revolution in February 1917, the Soviet Union was left with a insufficient amount of grain, a major commodity. The main part of it, as Melnyczuk Morgan assumes, was owned by peasants, and was predominantly distributed among them. Thus, in order to retrieve the domination over the production of grain, Moscow violently enforced harsh confiscation of it from peasants (Melnyczuk Morgan, 2010). But in the case of the Kazakh famine, it was used as a method targeting nomads, a lifestyle that the Kazakhs were accustomed to. Through the implementation of collectivization, Stalin aimed to eliminate the nomadism of Kazakhs and radically transform their lifestyle with a complete disregard to the traditions and cultural
background, organization of life which had prevailed in the region for centuries, and potential consequences; it was an intended genocide of Kazakh nation.
As a part of collectivization, Goloshchekin (a Russian politician who was employed by Stalin to work with Kazakh government) with the absolute support of Stalin enabled a plan called “small October” which focused on forcing Kazakh people into becoming more dependent on Russia through eliminating their national language and culture, and demolishing their traditional way of life through a new political institutional structure based on the exploitation of resources and the people of Kazakhstan (Olliver, 2015). As the same source states, he believed that the nomadic culture of the Kazakhs was against his ideals of socialism, as he was convinced that in order to implement this policy successfully, the national differences between people should be eliminated. However, he failed to realize that nomadic lifestyle was actually a part of Kazakh’s culture as ‘more than three-quarters of Kazakhs led a nomadic lifestyle and depended solely on their livestock’ (Magauin, 2008). Left without cattle, Kazakhs had no means to survive (Magauin, 2008). Moreover, through the implementation of ‘small October’, Goloshchekin decided to change the Kazakh alphabet so that Kazakhs could not study their history and to make their language sound more ‘Russian’ (Cameron, 2018).
The consequences of collectivization for the Kazakh nation were fatal. The famine was its main outcome. The mass starvation in Kazakhstan was not the result of bad weather conditions, as Moscow stated, but a sad result of the Soviet Union’s tyrannical campaign of collectivization, the brutal altercation of the Kazakh lifestyle, and the systematic requisitions of grain and livestock (Melnyczuk Morgan, 2010). It is estimated that more than 1.5 million people died during the famine (some sources even report more than 2 million), 1.3 million of whom were ethnically Kazakh. More than 60% of the entire Kazakh population was lost during collectivization, causing it to be the most severe of all regions affected by the famine and the most systematic ethnic massacre of the Soviet famines in the early 1930s (Goble, 2016). Prior to the famine, approximately sixty percent of the country’s population was Kazakh, but drastically decreased to twenty-eight (Magauin, 2008). Moreover, ‘experiences of terror, mass executions, deportations and forced collectivization preceded the famine’ (MelnyczukMorgan, 2010). ‘Thousands of Kazakhs fled to China, but fewer than one-fourth survived the journey; about 300,000 fled to Uzbekistan and 44,000 to Turkmenistan’ (‘Kazakhstan’, n.d.) The famine made the Kazakhs a minority within their own country (Hays, 2008). It was only after 1991, when the republic gained its own independence, and the Kazakh people recover a slim demographic majority within their own country (Hays, 2008).
I discussed these events with my relatives, whose forefathers faced and experienced such discrimination. My aunt replied, “My mother’s four brothers and three sisters died during the famine. My grandfather, who literally saw his children dying because of the famine, once found a cow on the steppes and he brought it home to cook for his children. One Russian woman saw it and complained to the police. My grandfather was arrested and shot for eating, and his whole family was left alone. My grandmother was disabled and she could not work, so almost all of my mother’s sisters and brothers died during this time. My mother and her elder sister were able to escape to Iran”. According to my uncle: “My grandfather told me that his whole family died because of the famine. He said that once food was brought to the village. Everyone was told to line up and wait for their turn. The man who distributed the food said that the Russians were the first to receive food”.
Some people, who defend Stalin and believe that collectivization did not have genocidal nature, argue that the government did not expect Kazakh famine to happen at all. However, Andrea Graziosi, a historian of the Soviet era, proves (1996) the government was aware of the possibility of mass catastrophe, and Stalin himself at the Communist Party Congress in 1925 had stated the high chance of it. Moreover, the secret correspondence between Stalin and Goloshchekin after the collapse of the Soviet Union was finally brought to light; it is clearly demonstrated by letters that they both decided to pretend that ‘there are no needs to consider social and economic features of the republic as it is already "resemble in every detail the central regions of the country"’ (‘The consequences of collectivization’, n.d.). Moreover, a lot of well-known Kazakh historians, such as famous Alikhan Bokeikhanov, wrote numerous letters to government with the warnings that it would take about two-hundred years to reverse Kazakhs nomadism and to peacefully settle in one place; Goloshchekin asserted that he could force them to do it in two-three years (Kindler, 2009). Thus, it could be reasonably inferred that the Soviet government was fully conscious of its actions, and absolutely aware of the possibility of mass catastrophe.
Some Russian historians claim that the famine and grain requisition was conducted everywhere across the Soviet Union, so there is no reason to imply that Stalin targeted Kazakhs. However, although the fact that other regions were starving is undeniable, the fact that approximately ninety-five percent of the livestock and grain cultivated by Kazakhs were taken by the Soviet Union to assist other starving regions (‘The consequences of collectivization, n.d.), despite that the Kazakhs starving the most, implies that Moscow undertook one of the most inhumane sacrifices for the sake of other regions. Сonducted under the aegis of equality, Kazakhs were lured into the dispossession of their cattle and was exploited by Russian forces after the economic crash following the World War. Moreover ‘Kazakhs suffered proportionally much larger losses than other ethnic groups in Kazakhstan and that neighbouring Central Asian republics suffered no such devastating famines’ (Magauin, 2008). Taking all these factors into account, ‘the failures of the Soviet policy of collectivization doesn't seem a sufficient explanation for the famine’ (Magauin, 2008), as there is clearly a tendency of targeting a particular ethnic group, namely Kazakhs.
Even though the Kazakh famine is one of the most severe (by the death toll) genocides in the world, just after the Holocaust and Holodomor, the Kazakh government does not admit the genocidal nature of famine. The Kazakh genocide is one of the most underrepresented genocides in the world. Because of the close relationship with Russia, the famine is not included in the school curriculum, nor are there any days to commemorate the victims of it.
Nowadays, Kazakh people still experience discrimination. Even now Kazakhs tend to hide their culture, traditions and history because they are still afraid. The thing that can be done to improve the situation is in the hands of the government. They have to respect our past and our shared history, in order for future generations not to forget it. I am inclined to believe that government has to spread the information about genocide through the youth, include it in school curriculum and construct some of the memorials to the victims of the famine. Moreover, we, the youth, have to treat our history with respect and appreciation. We, the new generation, raised in a new independence, should be proud to be Kazakhs, proud to speak in Kazakh language, and proud of our history.
Sources:
https://blogs.loc.gov/kluge/2016/08/the-kazakh-famine-of-the-1930s/
https://e-history.kz/en/contents/view/294
https://www.britannica.com/place/Kazakhstan/Cultural-life
https://www.eurasiareview.com/01062016-another-soviet-genocide-kazakhstan-1932-1933-coming-back-to-haunt-moscow-oped/
http://factsanddetails.com/central-asia/Kazakhstan/sub8_4b/entry-4642.html
http://muse.jhu.edu/article/181904
https://www.britannica.com/topic/collectivization
https://e-history.kz/en/expert/view/91
http://euromaidanpress.com/2015/02/02/stalins-holodomor-in kazakhstan-or-a-very-brief-guide-to-the-goloshchekin-genocide/
https://www.sciencespo.fr/mass-violence-war-massacre-resistance/fr/node/3200
